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1.1 Topic and issues 
The Norwegian Constitution § 110 first paragraph, first sentence, states that the authorities of the 
State shall create conditions under which every person capable of work is able to earn a living 
through their work or enterprise.1  
Within the framework of Norway’s constitutional obligations as laid down in § 110, this thesis will 
explore the facilitation of the participation of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the 
public procurement of labour market programmes. The thesis’ outset is that legal dilemmas may 
arise when facilitating the participation of SMEs in the procurement of labour market programmes. 
Central to this notion is the tension between the demands of the general interest of the society, and 
the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights.  
A central tenet of this thesis is that a first interpretation of § 110 imposes a legal barrier as to what 
measures the contracting authority may make us of in the effort to facilitate the participation of 
SMEs in the procurement of labour market programmes. The aim, therefore, is to determine if this is 
the case, and what are the consequences of such a limitation.  
1.1.1 The right to work 
Full employment is an overarching political objective2 and Norway is, traditionally, among the OECD-
countries that spend the most public funding on various labour market programmes and benefits for 
unemployed people.3 Participation in working life not only provides an income to cover life expenses, 
it is also crucial in creating a sense of usefulness and belonging. The Norwegian State’s constitutional 
obligation concerning employment is thus enshrined in § 110 in the human rights chapter of the 
Constitution, and the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights article 23 (1) states that “Everyone 
has the right to work.”  
As part of fulfilling the State’s constitutional obligations on the right to work,4 the Norwegian Labour 
and Welfare Service (NAV) offers a wide range of labour market programmes. In 2019, an average 
total of 66 937 people participated in one of these programmes.5 The labour market programmes 
aim, in general, to strengthen the participants’ possibility to find and sustain employment.6 
1.1.2 Efficient use of society’s resources 
The overall political objective for the economic policy is, within a framework of sustainable 
development, to maximize value creation in the Norwegian economy.7 The public procurement 
regulations are a means to achieve this objective in public demand driven markets. The Public 
 
1 LOV-1814-05-17; «Statens myndigheter skal legge forholdene til rette for at ethvert arbeidsdyktig menneske kan tjene til 
livets opphold ved arbeid eller næring”. Translation: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NLE/lov/1814-05-17. References in this 
thesis to § 110, first paragraph, first sentence, will hereafter be abbreviated as § 110.  
2 https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/arbeidsliv/arbeidsmarked-og-sysselsetting/id935/  
3 NOU Arbeidsrettede tiltak 2012:6 
4 Asbjørn Kjønstad, Aslak Syse og Morten Kjelland, Velferdsrett I: Grunnleggende rettigheter, rettssikkerhet og tvang, 
Gyldendal Juridisk, 6th ed. 2017, p. 143 
5 https://www.nav.no/no/nav-og-samfunn/statistikk/arbeidssokere-og-stillinger-statistikk/tiltaksdeltakere 
6 FOR-2015-12-11-1598 § 1-1 
7 Meld. St. 9 (2018-2019) p. 3 
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Procurement Act aims at promoting efficient use of society’s resources based on fair competition, 
equal treatment of suppliers, transparency, and proportionality.8  
The overall market for public procurement in Norway amounts to approximately 500 billion every 
year, constituting 16 % of the GDP.9 This mirrors the current situation in the EU, where EU Member 
States spend around 14 % of GDP on the procurement of services, works and supplies every year.10 
As for labour market programmes, NAV spent 5.8 billion on various labour market programmes in 
2018, out of which 2.9 billion was used on labour market programmes subject to the public 
procurement regulations.11  
The public sector is thus a substantial and significant market, and the ability to obtain contracts with 
the state is important to many businesses, including the small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
The participation of SMEs in public procurement is, moreover, considered pivotal in securing the 
positive effect of higher competition for public contracts, leading to better value for money for the 
contracting authorities.12 SMEs are also often referred to as the backbone of the European economy 
with a high potential for creating employment opportunities, growth and innovation.13  
Within the EU, considerable attention is being paid on how to facilitate the participation of SMEs in 
public procurements. The Commission of the European Communities has developed a code of best 
practices on how to facilitate SMEs’ access to public procurement.14 Directive 2014/24/EU also 
explicitly states that the public procurement regulations should aim at “facilitating in particular the 
participation of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in public procurement,” and, 
furthermore, that public procurement “should be adapted to the needs of SMEs.”15 
Similarly, the Norwegian government has stated that access to public contracts for providers of 
goods and services is important so that more companies can create value for society, expressing an 
aim that all suppliers that want to shall be able to participate in competitions for public contracts.16 
In “Granavolden-plattformen” the government in particular stresses a focus on small and medium-
sized companies, pledging to work towards allowing both small and medium-sized enterprises a fair 
possibility to compete for the award of public contracts.17  
1.2 What is the dilemma? 
In recent years, secondary aims of the public procurement regulations have gained increased focus 
and relevance. In particular, environmental and social considerations have been identified as 
important social goals that can be met through public procurement. One of the aims of the Directive 
2014/24/EU is, consequently, to impulse the 2020 policy for “smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth” while ensuring the most efficient use of public funds.18  
 
8 LOV-2016-06-17-73 §§ 1 and 4 
9 Meld. St. 22 (2018-2019), p. 20 
10 ec.europa.eu (official EU website) 
11 Riksrevisjonen, Revisjonsrapport for 2018 om anskaffelser og oppfølging av arbeidsmarkedstiltak i arbeids- og 
velferdsetaten, p. 4 
12 Commission of the European communities, 2008, p. 2 
13 Ibid. p. 4 
14 Ibid.  
15 Directive 2014/24/EU, rec. 2 and 78.  
16 Meld. St. 22 (2018-2019) p. 11 
17 Politisk plattform, Granavolden 17. January 2019, p. 36 
18 Directive 2014/24/EU, rec. 2 
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As for the right to work, Directive 2014/24/EU acknowledges the importance of employment, stating 
in the preamble that “employment and occupation contribute to integration in society and are key 
elements in guaranteeing equal opportunities for all.”19  
The basic aim of the public procurement regime is, nonetheless, to promote efficient use of society’s 
resources by opening up the markets to competition.20 The Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) has thus expressed that the “principle objective” of the public procurement regulations is to 
ensure the “free movement” of services and the “opening up” of the market to “undistorted 
competition.”21 The prohibition in the Directive 2014/24/EU article 18 (1) against “artificially 
narrowing competition” further underscores this point. 
The public procurement rules are thus not primarily concerned with the enforcement of 
environmental or other social standards. From a normative perspective, then, the public 
procurement regulations “do not mandate the use of procurement for the enforcement or promotion 
of human rights norms.”22 Relevant decisions that relate to human rights norms are, therefore, to a 
large extent left to the discretion of the contracting authorities, and, consequently, subject to the 
relevant checks and balances.23  
There is, regardless of what service or good that is being procured, always a need to balance the 
measures that can promote the participation of SMEs against other considerations that are 
important to the contracting authority. This balancing of interest is, in my view, especially important 
in the procurements of services that are pivotal in the securing of the individual’s fundamental rights.  
A special characteristic of labour market programmes is that they are essential tools in the fulfilling 
of the State’s constitutional human rights obligations pursuant to § 110 of the Norwegian 
Constitution. Opening up the market to competition by means of facilitating the participation of 
SMEs may lead the contracting authorities to make decisions that are more focused on the objective 
of the public procurement regulations, than on the individual’s right to work. The procurement of 
labour market programmes and the facilitation of the participation of SMEs in these procurements 
thus demonstrate a tension between the demands of the general interest of the society, and the 
requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights.  
1.3 Research questions and outline 
The legal effect of the Norwegian Constitution § 110 in the procurement of labour market 
programmes has, to my knowledge, not been debated in legal theory, nor has it been tried before 
the courts. The purpose of my thesis, therefore, is to discuss what legal dilemmas may arise when 
facilitating the participation of SMEs in the procurement of labour market programmes. I also aim to 
clarify whether § 110 imposes a legal barrier as to what measures the contracting authority may 
make us of in this respect, and to determine what will be the consequences of such a limitation.  
 
19 Directive 2014/24/EU, rec. 36 
20 LOV-2016-06-17-73 §§ 1 and 4 
21 C-454/06 – Pressetext Nachrichtenagentur, paras. 32-33 




23 Ibid.  
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Moreover, I will ask the question of whether the aim in Directive 2014/24/EU to facilitate the 
participation of SMEs has sparked a change in NAVs procurement practice regarding the 
procurements of labour market programmes.  
My thesis follows an outline in which, first, in the following chapter, the legal sources and 
methodological approach is established. The answering of the question of whether § 110 imposes a 
legal barrier as to what measures the contracting authority may make us of in the effort to facilitate 
the participation of SMEs in the procurement of labour market programmes, requires an initial 
interpretation of the strength of the constitutional protection of the individual’s right to work, which 
will be presented in chapter 3.  
In chapter 4, I will look more closely into the nature of labour market programmes, and the 
procurement regulations governing the procurement processes of these programmes. In chapter 5, I 
will explore what means are available to the contracting authorities that may facilitate the 
participation of SMEs in the procurement of labour market programmes and point out possible 
dilemmas in light of my thesis’ research problem. In chapter 6, I will present a case-study of two 
procurement processes conducted by NAV in 2015/2016 and 2019/2020 concerning framework 
agreements on two specific labour market programmes. 
In chapter 7, I will focus my attention on what I believe to be the most problematic measure in the 
facilitation of the participations of SMEs in the procurement of labour market programmes, and 
present a legal analysis that aims to clarify whether this measure is in conflict with the constitutional 
protection of the individual’s right to work. Furthermore, I will look at what are the consequences of 
such a limitation. In chapter 8, I will end with a conclusion, and present a view to the future. 
2. Sources of law and methodology 
2.1 Overview 
My thesis’ main focus is to offer a legal dogmatic analysis in which I am resorting to both national 
and international law in the effort to answer my thesis’ research problem. As my introduction has 
shown, the answering of my research problem requires the use of sources from different areas of 
law. The Norwegian Constitution and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well 
as both Norwegian and EU legislation on public procurement, are sources that are especially relevant 
for my analysis. The presence of constitutional rights and international law has made it necessary for 
me to discuss and establish the hierarchy of legal norms within the Norwegian jurisdiction, as well as 
the legal effect of international law in the areas pertinent to my research problem.  
2.2 The impact of EU law on public procurement 
The doctrinal starting point in Norwegian law is that of dualism,26 which entails that international law 
has to be incorporated or transformed into Norwegian law by the competent political institutions, 
before it can be given legal effect in Norway.  
As party to the EEA-agreement, Norway has an obligation to implement EU law on public 
procurement.27 New regulations on public procurement entered into force in Norway on January 1, 
 
26 Justice dr. juris Arnfinn Bårdsen, Norwegian Supreme Court: The Norwegian Supreme Court and the internationalisation 
of law. Norwegian Supreme Court, para 7.  
27 LOV-1992-11-27-109 art. 3 
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2017. The main reason behind the change in regulations was a need to implement the new EU 
Directives on public procurement.28 Norwegian law and regulations on public procurement is thus 
largely an enforcement of Norway’s obligations under the EEA-agreement.  
The procurement of labour market programmes falls under the scope of the Public Sector Directive 
2014/24 EU, which regulates the procurement procedures for the award of public work contracts, 
public supply contracts and public service contracts. Public procurement in Norway is regulated by 
the Public Procurement Act and accompanying regulations, the most important being the Public 
Procurement Regulation.29  
Public procurement law is closely linked to EU-politics and the basic aims of the Treaty of the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) regarding the free movements of goods, services, capital 
and persons.30 When interpreting EU-law on public procurement, the CJEU applies a teleological 
method of interpretation, paying particular attention to the aim and purpose of EU-law.31 The 
decisions of the CJEU are binding to the Member States, in contrast to the decisions of the EFTA-
court, which are only advisory.32   
The EEA agreement contains an explicit aim to harmonize EEA and EU law.33 This implies that there is 
a presumption of conformity between Norwegian domestic law stemming from the EEA-agreement, 
and EU-law. Directive 2014/24 EU, as well as the decisions of the CJEU, are thus important legal 
sources when interpreting Norwegian law on public procurement.   
2.3 The impact of international human rights law 
The impact of international human rights law was triggered in 1999 through the passing of the 
Human Rights Act.39 Pursuant to §§ 2 and 3 of this act, the European Convention on Human Rights as 
well as four other UN-conventions are to be considered Norwegian law, with priority over other 
legislation. As for the right to work, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights is the Covenant that deals most comprehensively with this right.40  
The State’s general obligation to respect and ensure human rights was accentuated more clearly as 
part of the 2014 constitutional reform; § 92 of the Norwegian Constitution now states that the 
authorities of the State shall respect and ensure human rights as they are expressed in this 
Constitution and in the treaties concerning human rights that are binding for Norway.41  
The referral to “treaties concerning human rights that are binding for Norway” implies that the 
constitutional and the international context run parallel; the level of human rights protection 
according to the Norwegian constitution “shall not run short to that of the parallel convention 
 
28 Innst. 358 L (2015-2016), p. 2 
29 LOV-2016-06-17-73 and FOR-2016-08-12-974 
30 Directive 2014/24/EU, rec. 1 
31 C-283-00 Commission v. Spain, para 73 
32 The EFTA-court interprets the EEA-agreement on behalf of the EFTA-states Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway 
33 Ibid. art. 1 (1) 
39 LOV-1999-05-21-30 
40 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 
1966, A/RES/2200 
41 «Statens myndigheter skal respektere og sikre menneskerettighetene slik de er nedfelt i denne grunnlov og i for Norge 
bindende traktater om menneskerettigheter» 
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rights.”42 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is thus an important 
legal source when determining the strength of the constitutional protection of the right to work 
pursuant to § 110 of the Norwegian Constitution.   
2.4 The Norwegian Constitution and constitutional interpretation  
In line with traditional legal method, the constitutional text is always the starting point for the 
establishing of the legal rule. The text is, however, just the starting point; the framer’s intentions, the 
constitutional history, the context and the provisions object and purpose will also have to be taken 
into consideration.43  
The basic legal effect of constitutional rights is that they acquire the force of lex superior, which 
implies that constitutional rights have the highest possible rank in the hierarchy of legal norms that 
are applicable within the Norwegian jurisdiction; any other law, enactment, regulations or 
governmental decision must yield.44 Does this also apply to international agreements entered into by 
Norway?  
The Supreme Court of Norway answered this question in a ruling in 2016, where the Court ruled that 
the status of the Norwegian Constitution as lex superior also includes international agreements 
entered into by Norwegian government, such as the Human Rights Act and the EEA-agreement.45 As 
for my thesis’ research problem, this implies that if a conflict is established between the effort to 
facilitate the participation of SMEs in the public procurement of labour market programmes and the 
constitutional protection of § 110, then the Constitution will prevail.  
2.5 The fair balance test 
A particular methodological approach when dealing with constitutional and convention rights is ‘the 
fair balance principle’. This principle has been established through case-law from the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECHR) and implies that the State, when dealing with these rights, must strike a ‘fair 
balance’ between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of 
the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights, attaching particular importance to the latter.46 
The Norwegian Supreme Court has also applied this fair balance principle in a 2016 ruling on the 
constitutional protection of the freedom of association and freedom of assembly pursuant to § 101 
of the Norwegian Constitution.47  
The assessment to be followed when performing the fair balance test involves a two-step analysis. 
First, the lawfulness of the interference in the fundamental right is established. This implies a 
verifying of whether the contested provision affects the core content of the human right, or if the 
freedom can still be exercised otherwise. The next step is the evaluation of the proportionality of the 
interference, which involves a consideration of the legitimate aim of the measure; that is if the 
 
42 Supreme Court Justice dr. Arnfinn Bårdsen, Norwegian Supreme Court: Interpreting the Norwegian Bill of Rights (Annual 
seminar on Comparative Constitutionalism 21-22 November 2016 Faculty of Law, University of Oslo) para 17 
43 Supreme Court Justice dr. Arnfinn Bårdsen, Norwegian Supreme Court: The Norwegian Supreme Court as the Guardian of 
Constitutional Rights and Freedoms (“Norway in Europe, Centre for European Law, Oslo 18th September 2017), para. 19 
44 Ibid. para. 3 
45 HR-2016-2554-P para. 80 
46The Belgian Linguistic case (No. 2) (1968) 1 EHRR 252, Case C-314/12 UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v Constantin Film Verleih 
GmbH and Wega Filmproduktionsgesellschaft mbH [2014] EU:C:2014:192,  Beyeler v. Italy ECHR 2000-I 57 para. 107, 
Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, IHRL 36 (ECHR 1982) para. 69.  
47 HR-2016-2554-P para. 117 
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measure was adopted in the public or general interest, the appropriateness of the measure; that is if 
the measure is effective and adequate to achieve its purpose, the necessity of the measure; that is if 
a solution of less interference can achieve the same goal, and then, finally, the fair balance test, 
which is the assessment of whether the measure managed to strike a fair balance between the 
demands of the public or general interest and the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights.48  
The rationale of the fair balance principle is to provide effective protection of fundamental rights, 
while at the same time allowing the State a margin of appreciations when it comes to regulating the 
exercise of these rights. The application of this principle will, therefore, commonly involve a 
consideration of both political, economic and social issues. 
The fair balance principle has been criticised by scholars who advocate a narrow, positivistic notion 
of law and who require a clearer textual basis for the acceptance of specific obligations.49 As will be 
demonstrated in my analysis, the textual guidance of § 110 of the Norwegian Constitution is limited, 
and a legal conclusion can therefore not be drawn simply by looking at the wording of this provision. 
The fair balance principle will, therefore, be prevalent in my analysis.  
2.6 The NAV case-study 
As my thesis will show, many of the measures that may facilitate the participation of SMEs in public 
procurement are subject to discretionary decisions by the contracting authority. The motivation 
behind looking into the NAV procurement processes, therefore, is to make use of empirical data to 
illustrate the relevance of my thesis, and to gain insight that is valuable to qualify my thesis’ research 
problem.  
Being employed at NAV, I know these procurement processes well. What makes these processes 
particularly relevant in light of my research problem, I believe, is that Directive 2014/24/EU had not 
yet been implemented in Norwegian law at the time of the 2015/2016 process. The procurements 
were thus conducted according to the regulations in the repealing Directive 2004/18/EC and 
repealing Public Procurement Act and Regulation.50 Directive 2004/18/EC did not contain an explicit 
aim to facilitate the participation of SMEs. It is therefore relevant to examine whether this explicit 
aim in Directive 2014/24/EU has sparked a change in procurement practice.   
The case-study will only make use of publicly available information on these procurement processes, 
the main source being the contract notices published on Doffin, which is the Norwegian national 
database for notices of public procurements. To make the case-study manageable for the purpose 
and scope of this thesis, it will be restricted mainly to the procurement processes in NAV Rogaland.  
 
 
48  Case C-283/11 Sky Österreich GmbH v Österreichischer Rundfunk [2013] EU:C: 2013:28, Case C-314/12 UPC Telekabel 
Wien GmbH v Constantin Film Verleih GmbH and Wega Filmproduktionsgesellschaft mbH [2014]  
EU:C: 2014:192. See also Caterina Sganga; A Decade of Fair Balance Doctrine, and How to Fix It. 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3414642 
49 Jonas Christoffersen, Fair Balance: Proportionality, Subsidiarity and Primarity in the European Convention on Human 
Rights, (Copyright 2009 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands) p. 199 
50 Lov om offentlige anskaffelser av 16. juli 1999 nr. 69 og forskrift om offentlig anskaffelser av 7. april 2006 nr. 402 
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3. The strength of the constitutional protection of the right to work  
3.1 An unconditional claim to employment? 
With regard to the strength of the constitutional protection of the right to work, the most basic 
question is whether § 110 gives the individual an unconditional claim to employment. The provision 
states that “The authorities of the State shall create conditions under which every person capable of 
work is able to earn a living through their work or enterprise.”51 Looking only at the wording of the 
provision, a first interpretation could be, although the text is not clear on the matter, that the State is 
obliged to ensure that every person capable of work is provided with a specific opportunity to work, 
or to run an enterprise. The establishing of the legal rule requires, however, that the constitutional 
history and the framer’s intention is also taken into consideration.  
3.2 Constitutional history and the framer’s intention 
The idea of the State’s obligation to provide employment for all people who are able to work 
surfaced in various declarations from the French revolution as early as in the 18th. century.52 It was 
not until after the Second World War, however, that this obligation was established in the Norwegian 
Constitution. In the post-war years, there was a political consensus that the State should conduct a 
politics that aimed at full employment. The post-war constitutional change has to be understood as 
part of the rebuilding of Norway after the war, focusing on economic growth and possibilities for 
everyone.53 
On November 16, 1954, a new provision was added to the Norwegian Constitution § 110. This new 
provision laid down that “It is the responsibility of the authorities of the State to create conditions 
enabling every person capable of work to earn a living by his or her work.”54 The initiative to the 
amendment came in a letter sent from the Ministry of Social Affairs to the Ministry of Justice and 
Police on August 18, 1948. The initial proposal did not receive the required constitutional majority of 
votes, as the minority in Parliament perceived the proposal as not sufficiently clear on the matter of 
the proposal being intended as a political platform, and not a legal binding constitutional right and 
obligation. During the debate in Parliament a new proposal was made, which was later accepted in 
1954.55   
3.3 Current constitutional law 
As a result of the constitutional revision in 2014, § 110 is now placed in the human rights chapter of 
the Constitution. Another change following the constitutional revision is that “enterprise” has been 
included in the provision. § 110 now states that “The authorities of the State shall create conditions 
under which every person capable of work is able to earn a living thorough their work or 
enterprise”.56 The inclusion of “enterprise” has broadened the scope of the provision, signalling a 
 
51 «Statens myndigheter skal legge forholdene til rette for at ethvert arbeidsdyktig menneske kan tjene til livets opphold ved 
arbeid eller næring”. Translation: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NLE/lov/1814-05-17 
52 The French Constitution of 1791; Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1793, see Frede Castberg, Norges Statsforfatning II, 
Oslo 1964, p. 307 
53 Henriette Sinding Aasen and Nanna Kildal in Henriette Sinding Aasen and Nanna Kildal (red.) Grunnloven og 
velferdsstaten, Fagbokforlaget Vigmostad & Bjørke AS 2014, p. 111 
54  LOV-1814.05-17: «Det paaligger Statens Myndigheder at lægge Forholdende til Rette for at ethvert arbeidsdygtigt 
Menneske kan skaffe seg Udkomme ved Sit Arbeide». Translation: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NLE/lov/1814-05-17 
55 Dokument 16 (2011-2012), Rapport fra Menneskerettighetsutvalget om menneskerettigheter i Grunnloven, avgitt 19. 
desember 2011, p. 227 and 228 
56 «Statens myndigheter skal legge forholdene til rette for at ethvert arbeidsdyktig menneske kan tjene til livets opphold ved 
arbeid eller næring”. Translation: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NLE/lov/1814-05-17 
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responsibility for the State to conduct a politics that is not only conducive to the individual’s right to 
work, but that is also conducive to a well-functioning labour market.  
As for the basic question of whether § 110 gives the individual an unconditional claim to 
employment, it is today considered to be positive law that this provision is to be understood as a 
directive outlining the State’s obligation to conduct a politics that is conducive to employment, trade 
and industry.57 This understanding implies that the provision does not constitute a legal right that 
gives the individual an unconditional claim to employment, or that can serve as basis for legal 
proceedings against the State for the lack thereof. 
3.4 The constitutional obligation to respect and ensure human rights 
This understanding does not imply, however, that § 110 is of no legal significance. The Norwegian 
Constitution § 92 requires every governmental body, including the Supreme Court of Norway, to 
respect and ensure human rights as they are expressed in the Norwegian Constitution and in the 
treaties concerning human rights that are binding for Norway. 
The right to work imposes, as all human rights, three types or levels of obligations on the State; the 
obligations to respect, to protect and to fulfil.58 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights is the Covenant that deals most comprehensively with the right to work.60  
Pursuant to Article 6, paragraph 1 of the Covenant, the State recognises that the right to work 
“includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or 
accepts” and that the State “will take appropriate steps to safeguard this right.” Article 6, paragraph 
2 exemplifies in a general and non-exhaustive manner obligations incumbent upon the State; to 
achieve the full realization of the right to work the steps taken “shall include technical and vocational 
guidance and training programmes, policies and techniques to achieve steady economic, social and 
cultural development and full and productive employment, under conditions safeguarding 
fundamental political and economic freedoms to the individual.” 
As for the extent of the State’s obligations, the Covenant establishes a core obligation to ensure the 
satisfaction of minimum essential levels of each of the rights covered by the Covenant. These core 
obligations include at least a requirement “to ensure the right of access to employment, especially for 
disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups, permitting them to live a life in dignity,” and 
to “avoid any measure that results in discrimination and unequal treatment in the private and public 
sectors of disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups or in weakening mechanisms for 
the protection of such individuals and groups.”61 
The principal obligation of the State is to ensure “the progressive realization of the exercise of the 
right to work.” The Covenant imposes, however, various obligations which are of immediate effect. 
 
57 Henriette Sinding Aasen and Nanna Kildal in Henriette Sinding Aasen and Nanna Kildal (red.) Grunnloven og 
velferdsstaten, Fagbokforlaget Vigmostad & Bjørke AS 2014, p. 110, and also Asbjørn Kjønstad, Aslak Syse og Morten 
Kjelland, Velferdsrett I: Grunnleggende rettigheter, rettssikkerhet og tvang, Gyldendal Juridisk, 6th ed. 2017, p. 36 
58 E/C.12/GC/18, 6 February 2006, General comment No. 18 Article 6 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights para. 22 
60 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 
1966, A/RES/2200 
61 E/C.12/GC/18, 6 February 2006, General comment No. 18 Article 6 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights para. 31 
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This entails an obligation to “guarantee” that the protection of the right to work will be exercised 
“without discrimination of any kind” and the obligation “to take steps” to ensure the realisation of 
this right.62 Even though the Covenant acknowledges that the realization of the right to work is 
progressive and takes place over a period of time, it emphasises that this fact should not be 
interpreted as depriving the State’s obligation of meaningful content. The State therefore has an 
obligation to “move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards the full realization of article 
6.”63 
Moreover, a general principle of equality is now laid down in the Norwegian Constitution § 98, which 
states that all people are equal under the law and that no human must be subject to unfair or 
disproportionate differential treatment. This provision is part of the State’s constitutional obligation 
to ensure that all individuals and groups of people are allowed to participate in working life.  
3.5 Judicial review of § 110 
The threshold for judicial review must be separated from the interpretation of the material rule. The 
boundaries are, however, sometimes difficult to draw. In the legal preparations leading up to the 
constitutional revision in 2014, the threshold for judicial review was debated alongside with the 
material rule. According to the preparatory work, the threshold for judicial review of § 110 is 
presumed to be very high.64 To the courts, then, § 110 has been of little significance. In 1996 the 
Borgarting appeal court rejected the relevance of this provision on the basis that it does not give the 
individual a legal claim against the State.65 This was also the case in a ruling from a District Court in 
2019.66 The legal effect of this provision has, however, not been tried before the Norwegian Supreme 
Court.  
Legal theory suggests that the provision may serve as a basis for legal proceedings in cases where the 
State is conducting a politics that is blatantly undermining the aim of full employment, for instance 
by using mass-unemployment as a political monetary tool.67 Other legal sources suggest that if the 
State does not fulfil its obligations to facilitate the individual’s participation in working life, this may 
constitute a violation of § 110. Even though the individual cannot make a claim for work on the basis 
of this provision, a person with legal interest may still instigate legal proceedings with a claim that 
State legislation or practice is in breach with § 110.68 
4. The procurement of labour market programmes 
4.1 The importance of employment 
As pointed out in chapter 1, full employment is an overarching political objective. It is in the interest 
of society that as many people as possible are employed and able to provide for themselves. 
Participation in working life is also crucial for the individual in creating a sense of usefulness and 
belonging. The labour market programmes are important tools in the labour market policy, and shall 
 
62 Ibid. para. 19 
63 Ibid. para. 20 
64 Dokument 16 (2011-2012), Rapport fra Menneskerettighetsutvalget om menneskerettigheter i Grunnloven, avgitt 19. 
desember 2011, p. 231 
65 LB-1995-2823 
66 TOSLO-2019-177664 
67 Asbjørn Kjønstad, Aslak Syse og Morten Kjelland, Velferdsrett I: Grunnleggende rettigheter, rettssikkerhet og tvang, 
Gyldendal Juridisk, 6th ed. 2017, p. 134 
68 Henriette Sinding Aasen and Nanna Kildal in Henriette Sinding Aasen and Nanna Kildal (red.) Grunnloven og 
velferdsstaten, Fagbokforlaget Vigmostad & Bjørke AS 2014, p. 111 
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support the political aim of full employment.70 The labour market programmes are also part of the 
fulfilling of the State’s constitutional obligations on the right to work pursuant to § 110 of the 
Norwegian Constitution.71  
This chapter will look more closely into the nature of labour market programmes, and the regulations 
governing the procurement processes of these programmes. The aim is to explore whether the 
procurement regulations in itself indicates that the contracting authorities should exercise restraint 
in emphasising other considerations than the welfare of the individual when procuring these 
programmes.  
4.2 Labour market programmes 
The Labour Market Act aims at facilitating an inclusive working life through a well-functioning labour 
market with high levels of occupational employment and low unemployment.72 Pursuant to the 
Labour and Welfare Administration Act § 4, NAV is responsible for administering the Labour Market 
Act.73 The Labour and Welfare Administration Act § 14a entitles any person that seeks or needs 
assistance from a NAV office to find employment the right to an assessment of his or hers need for 
support.74 
Should the assessment conclude that a person is in need of a labour market program, a necessary 
and appropriate program may be initiated pursuant to the Labour Market Act § 12. The labour 
market programmes aim, in general, to strengthen the participants’ possibility to find and sustain 
employment.75 Pursuant to § 1-3 of the Labour Market Regulation, a condition for entering a 
program is that participation in the programme is both a necessary and appropriate means to 
increase the participant’s possibility to find and sustain employment.  
NAV offers a wide range of labour market programmes.76 The programmes include, in general, such 
programmes as education, training, work-practice, vocational rehabilitation, wage subsidy and 
general help and advice. The structure, content and length of the programmes vary depending on the 
nature of the programme and the participants’ need for assistance. The Labour Market Act does not 
give the individual a legal right to a labour market program. The NAV offices have the authority to 
decide whether a labour market program is to be initiated. The decision has, nevertheless, to be 
made according to the general principles of administrative law, which also gives the individual a right 
to lodge an appeal.77 
4.3 The procurement of labour market programmes 
The Public Procurement Regulation is divided into five parts, relating to value and classification of the 
procurement. In the procurement regime, labour market programmes are classified as health- and 
social-services.78 Directive 2014/24 EU establishes that Member States are free to determine the 
 
70 Riksrevisjonens undersøkelse av forvaltning og bruk av arbeidsmarkedstiltak i NAV, Dokument 3:5 (2017-2018) p. 7 
71 Asbjørn Kjønstad, Aslak Syse og Morten Kjelland, Velferdsrett I: Grunnleggende rettigheter, rettssikkerhet og tvang, 
Gyldendal Juridisk, 6th ed. 2017, p. 143 
72 LOV-2004-12-10-76 § 1 
73 Ibid. 
74 «Alle som henvender seg til kontoret, og som ønsker eller trenger bistand for å komme i arbeid, har rett til å få vurdert sitt 
bistandsbehov» 
75 FOR-2015-12-11-1598 § 1-1 
76 Ibid.  
77 LOV-2004-12-10-76 §§ 16 and 17 
78 FOR-2016-08-12-974 annex 3, Annex XIV of Directive 2014/24/EU. 
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procedural rules applicable for these services as long as such rules allow the contracting authorities 
to take into account the specificities of these services.80  
Pursuant to § 30-1 (3) of the Public Procurement regulation the contracting authorities may, 
therefore, take into account the specificities of these services in all phases of the procurement 
process. This applies in particular to the need to ensure quality, continuity, accessibility, affordability, 
availability and comprehensiveness of the services, the specific needs of different categories of users, 
and the involvement and empowerment of users and their participation in society.81 
Pursuant to § 5-1 of the Public Procurement Regulation, all procurements regardless of value or 
classification is subject to part I of the regulations, whereas procurements classified as health- and 
social services with an estimated net value equal to or greater than the EU-threshold, is subject to 
part IV of the regulation.  
Pursuant to § 5-3, the EU threshold for health- and social-services is MNOK 7.2.82 The procurements 
of labour market programmes with an estimated net value between NOK 100 000 and MNOK 7.2 are 
thus subject to the regulations as set out in part I of the Public Procurement Regulation, whereas the 
procurements of labour market programmes with an estimated net value equal to or greater than 
MNOK 7.2 are subject to the regulations as set out in part I and IV. For other services, the public 
procurement rules have to be applied for contracts with an estimated value net equal to or greater 
than MNOK 1, 3.84  
Part I contains few explicit rules, the inference thus being that the contracting authorities have a 
wide margin of appreciation when conducting procurements only subjected to the part I-regulation. 
Part IV follows largely the same scheme as set out in part I, although a few more rules apply; there is 
an obligation to use contract notices as a means of calling for competition, to send a contract award 
notice on the results of the procurement procedure, and a requirement that the award notice shall 
include a justification for the choice of tenderer. Moreover, a stand still period of at least 10 days 
applies.85  
Pursuant to § 30-1 (5) the contracting authorities are, furthermore, not bound by the regular 4-years 
limitations on the duration of framework agreements as set out in § 26-1 (4).86 The contracting 
authorities may therefore enter into long-term agreements if this is due, for instance, to the needs of 
the users of the service. 
To take account of the specific characteristics of health- and social-services, then, both a higher EU- 
threshold and a more lenient set of rules apply. This indicates a lack of cross-border relevance for the 
procurements of such services below the EU-threshold. It also acknowledges, I believe, a need for the 
contracting authorities not to be bound by strict procedural regulations when procuring such 
services, in which the need to ensure quality and continuity for the individual user is crucial.  
 
80 See also Directive 2014/24 EU art. 76 
81 Ibid. art. 76 (2) 
82 New thresholds apply from February 12, 2020: 
https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/48242c43007d4e4c95dec5d63b2df498/nye-terskelverdier-av-12-februar-
2020.pdf 
84 See also Directive 2014/24 EU art.  
85 FOR-2016-08-12-974 §§ 30-5, 30-7, 30-8 and 30-9. See also Directive 2014/24 EU art. 74-76 
86 See also Directive 2014/24/EU art. 33 (1) 
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5.  The facilitation of the participation of SMEs  
5.1 What is an SME?  
In the definition adopted by the Commission of the European Communities, the category of SME’s is 
made up of enterprises which employ fewer than 250 persons and which have an annual turnover 
not exceeding EUR 50 million and/or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding EUR 43 million.90  
The Directive 2014/24/EU refers to the definition of the Commission Recommendation from 2003. 
The Directive says, however, that the definition is to be used “for the purpose of this paragraph and 
paragraph 4 of this Article,” suggesting that the legal scope of the definition is limited to this specific 
provision in the Directive.91 If applying the EU definition, almost all enterprises in Norway would fall 
under the scope of the definition. An SME in a Norwegian context is normally understood as an 
enterprise which employs fewer than 100 persons.92 It is thus my understanding that the definition of 
what is an SME has to be understood relatively in relation to the specific country in question.  
5.2 The aim to facilitate the participation of SMEs in public procurement 
Directive 2014/24/EU contains an explicit aim to facilitate the participation of small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs). The preamble of the directive thus states that the public procurement 
regulations should aim at “facilitating in particular the participation of small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) in public procurement,” and, furthermore, that public procurement “should be 
adapted to the needs of SMEs.”93Being subject to the public procurement regulations, the 
procurement of labour market programmes is not exempt from this objective, as will also be 
demonstrated through the NAV case-study.  
In order to properly explore my thesis’ research problem; that legal dilemmas may arise when 
facilitating the participation of SMEs in the procurement of labour market programmes, it is 
necessary to look more closely at what measures are available to the contracting authority in this 
respect. I will also attempt to demonstrate that the interests of SMEs may be taken care of in the 
procurement of labour market programmes without this necessarily affecting negatively the 
protection of the individual’s right to work. It is, I believe, a matter of being aware of possible 
dilemmas and of finding a way to balance these different interests to create a win-win situation.  
My thesis’ research problem also indicates that not all measures available to facilitate the 
participation of SMEs are necessarily equally problematic in light of the constitutional obligations 
pursuant to § 110. If the interest of SMEs in the procurement of labour market programmes can be 
taken care of in a number of ways, without having to resort to measures that challenge the rights of 
the individual, then this is a relevant argument in a ‘fair balance’ analysis of the constitutional 
protection of the right to work.94 
 
90 2003/361/EC, annex I, art. 2  
91 Directive 2014/24/EU, art. 83 (3) 
92 Meld. St. 22 (2018-2019) p. 30 
93 Directive 2014/24/EU rec. 2 and 78.  




5.3 Measures that may facilitate the participation of SMEs in the procurement of 
labour market programmes 
The preamble of Directive 2014/24/EU states that the contracting authorities should be encouraged 
to use the European Code of Best Practices Facilitating Access by SMEs to Public Procurement 
Contracts. The contracting authorities should, in particular, be encouraged to divide large contracts 
into lots.95  
The division of contracts into lots is a measure that is particularly well suited both to enhance 
competition in general and to facilitate the participation of SMEs that may not be able to tender to 
larger contracts. The following analysis of the different measures that the contracting authorities 
may use will also include measures that are not directly targeted at the facilitation of the 
participation of SMEs, but that are nevertheless suited to enhance competition in general, thus more 
indirectly affecting the level of the participation of SMEs.  
The Public Procurement Regulation parts I and IV contain few explicit rules governing the 
procurement process. Applying a “the greater subsumes the lesser” approach, the inference is that 
everything that is allowed in the less flexible parts of the Public Procurement Regulation is allowed in 
parts I and IV, unless explicitly stated otherwise. The following analysis of the different measures that 
the contracting authorities may use to facilitate the participation of SMEs in public procurements of 
labour market programmes therefore contains legal references to part III of the Public Procurement 
Regulation. Part III regulates procurements above the EU-thresholds for most of the different 
categories of procurements that are subject to the Public Procurement Regulation.96  
5.3.1 Choice of procedure 
The contracting authorities’ choice of procedure affects the level of competition in public 
procurements in general. The Public Procurement Regulation § 13-1 provides a list of the different 
types of procedures allowed for procurements subjected to the Part III procedural regulations.97 
Following an interpretation of Part IV, § 30-1 (1) and (2), the contracting authority may choose any of 
these procedures in the procurement of labour market programmes.  
A basic division can be made between an open procedure and a restricted procedure. In an open 
procedure, any interested economic operator may submit a tender. In a restricted procedure, any 
economic operator may submit a request to participate, but only the economic operators invited to 
do so by the contracting authority may submit a tender. Other procedures are the competitive 
procedure with negotiation, competitive dialogue, innovation partnership and use of the negotiated 
procedure without prior publication.  
Labour market programmes are complex services. The need for dialogue with the tenderers may 
therefore be important to the contracting authorities. A way to balance the interests of both SMEs 
and the individual user of a labour market programme, I believe, is to use the competitive procedure 
with negotiation without pre-qualification, in which any interested economic operator may submit a 
tender. In that way, the contracting authority may facilitate the inclusion of SMEs while at the same 
 
95 Directive 2014/24 /EU rec. 78 
96 FOR-2016-08-12-974 § 5-1 (3) 
97 See also Directive 2014/24/EU art. 26-32 
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time being able, through negotiations, to adjust the tenders so that they meet the specifications of 
the contracting authority and the needs of the participants in these programmes.  
5.3.2 Selection criteria 
Pursuant to the Public Procurement Regulation § 16-1 (1), the contracting authority may impose 
selection criteria.98 Selection criteria serve the purpose of ensuring that a tenderer has the legal and 
financial capacities and the technical and professional abilities to perform the contract to be 
awarded. The selection criteria may only relate to suitability to pursue the professional activity, 
economic and financial standing and technical and professional ability. Pursuant to § 16-1 (2) the 
contracting authority may require means of proof as evidence for the fulfilment of the selection 
criteria.99  
As for the selection criteria regarding economic and financial standing, the contracting authority may 
only impose requirements that are relevant to ensure the performance of the contract to be 
awarded.101 This may include a requirement that tenderers have a certain minimum yearly turnover, 
including a certain minimum turnover in the area covered by the contract. The requirement cannot, 
however, exceed two times the estimated contract value, except in duly justified cases.102 With 
regard to the interests of SMEs, this regulation prevents the contracting authorities from making 
disproportional requirements, de facto excluding SMEs with smaller economies from tendering in the 
competition.  
As for the selection criteria regarding technical and professional ability, the contracting authorities 
may impose requirements that are relevant to ensure that tenderers possess the necessary human 
and technical resources and experience to perform the contract.103 This may include a requirement 
that tenderers have a sufficient level of experience demonstrated by documentation pertinent to the 
most important contracts performed in the past 3 years.104 The market for labour market 
programmes deviates from other markets in the respect that NAV is often the sole purchaser of 
these programmes. A requirement related to contracts performed could therefore be detrimental 
not only to the participation of SMEs, but to competition in general.  
The imposing of selection criteria is not compulsory, hence the wording in § 16-1 (1) that such 
requirements “may” be imposed. This allows the contracting authority a wide margin of appreciation 
which can be used to open up the competition to SMEs that may have difficulties in meeting certain 
criteria. Selection criteria are, however, often necessary to ensure that tenderers will be able to 
perform according to the needs of the contracting authority. Selection criteria may therefore be 
highly justified, even though the result is that some tenderers are excluded from the competition.  
This balancing of interests between opening up for competition and securing good performance by 
imposing selection criteria is, I believe, particularly important when procuring services that are 
pivotal in the securing of the individual’s fundamental rights, such as the right to work. In the 
procurement of labour market programmes the contracting authorities, therefore, will have to 
 
98 See also Directive 2014/24/EU art. 58 
99 Ibid. art. 60 
101 FOR-2016-08-12-974 § 16-3 (1) 
102 Ibid. § 16-3 (1)(a) 
103 Ibid. § 16-5 (1) 
104 Ibid. § 16-6 (1)(b) 
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impose selection criteria that help ensure quality and stability of performance, even if this means 
that the imposed selection criteria may reduce the level of participation of SMEs.  
5.3.3. Reliance on the capacities of other entities and joint tendering 
Pursuant to § 16-10 (1) of the Public Procurement Regulation, a supplier may rely on the capacity of 
other entities with regard to the selection criteria relating to economic and financial standing and 
technical and professional ability, as set out pursuant to § 16-1 (1).105 Pursuant to § 16-11 (1), the 
contracting authorities are furthermore required to accept certain forms of co-operation between 
tenderers.106 These possibilities in the regulations can be conducive to the participation of SMEs, 
should an SME on its own not be able to meet the criteria set out by the contracting authority. As for 
the protection of the individual’s right to work, I see no immediate disadvantages with respect to this 
measure.  
5.3.4 Subcontracting 
The possibility of using subcontractors follows presumably from § 19-2 (2) of the Public Procurement 
Regulation107, which states that a tenderer may be asked to indicate whether he intends to 
subcontract parts of the contract. The possibility of subcontracting has also been confirmed by EU-
rulings.108 A subcontractor is normally understood as an economic operator that tends to one or 
more of the contractual obligations that is concluded between the main economic operator and the 
contracting authority.109 Sub-contracting may provide SMEs with good opportunities, particularly 
where SMEs can provide added value in the form of specialised or innovative products or services.110  
As for work contracts relating to construction and cleaning, the contracting authority is obliged to 
limit subcontracting to only two subcontractor levels in the contract chain.111 According to legal 
preparations, this regulation is aimed at fighting crime in the workplace, in particular social 
dumping.112 The limitation does not, however, apply if a higher subcontractor level in the contract 
chain is necessary to secure a sufficient level of competition.113  
The limitation applies to specific work contracts. I will submit, however, that there is a legitimate 
concern that subcontracting will make it more difficult to ensure that contracts are effectively and 
properly carried out also in relation to service contracts. If a labour market programme is 
subcontracted, then at least it will be important for the contracting authorities to implement 
measures to monitor the supply-chain, to make sure that expectations are met.  
5.3.5 Award criteria 
Pursuant to § 18-1 (1) of the Public Procurement Regulation, the contracting authority may identify 
the most economically advantageous offer on the basis of the lowest price or cost, or best price-
 
105 See also Directive 2014/24 /EU art. 63 
106 Ibid. art. 19 
107 Ibid art. 71 (2) 
108 C-176/98 – Holst Italia para, 26 and 27 and C-314/01 – Siemens and ARGE Telekom para. 43 
109 https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/naringsliv/konkurransepolitikk/offentlige-anskaffelser-/andre-kolonne/bruk-av-
underleverandorer/id2563725/ 
110 Commission of the European communities, 2008, p.10 
111 FOR-2016-08-12-974 § 19-3 (1) 
112 NOU 2014:4 Enklere regler – bedre anskaffelser, p. 20 
113 FOR-2016-08-12-974 § 19-3 (2) 
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quality ratio.114 Pursuant to § 18- 1 (7), the contracting authority may also use a quality-only criterion 
for the award, provided that the cost-element takes the form of a fixed price or cost.  
Tenderers that are highly focused on quality, for instance SMEs that offer specialized services, may 
have difficulties in being awarded contracts in competitions where the most economically 
advantageous tender is identified on the basis of a price or cost alone, or where price or cost is given 
a relatively high weighting. It could therefore be conducive to the participation of SMEs to include a 
quality-criterion in the basis for the award of a contract, and, depending on the type of contract, give 
quality a relatively high weighting.  
Directive 2014/24 EU allows for the member states to prohibit the cost-only criterion for the award 
of health- and social services contracts.115 Such a prohibition has, however, not been implemented in 
Norwegian law. This implies that labour market programmes may, in theory, be awarded on the basis 
of a cost-only criterion. In general, a cost-only criterion will not allow the contracting authority to 
consider “the specificities of these services”, as required by Directive 2014/24/EU.116 For certain 
labour market programmes, for instance the obtaining of a driver’s license for heavy vehicles as 
offered by NAV in Agder, a cost-only criterion may not present a dilemma as only authorized 
personnel is allowed to give this training.117 The quality of the programme may then be secured 
through the imposing of a selection criteria relating to technical and professional ability of the 
tenderer pursuant to § 16-1 (1).  
5.3.6 Division of contracts into lots 
Pursuant to the Public Procurement Regulation § 19-4 (1), contracting authorities may decide to 
award the contract in the form of separate lots. Pursuant to § 19 (3) the contracting authority shall 
indicate in the contract notice or in the invitation to confirm interest, whether tenders may be 
submitted for one, for several or for all of the lots. Legal theory on the division of contracts into lots 
points out that putting more contracts out to tender, lowering their value, increases the chances for 
SMEs to win some lots and obtain “a slice of the procurement pie”.118  
The dividing of contracts into lots can be done on a quantitative or a qualitative basis. An SME 
tendering in a competition for a labour market programme may have an interest in tendering in 
certain areas whilst not in others or may have an interest in offering a specialized service. By dividing 
the contract into lots, the SMEs can opt to submit a tender for the number of lots that is appropriate 
for the capacity, area of expertise or geographical location of the company. NAV Oslo offers, for 
instance, specialized labour market programmes targeted at people with hearing-disabilities.119  
The possibility of awarding the contract in the form of separate lots does not ensure, however, that 
contracts for all lots are not awarded one tenderer only. Pursuant to § 19 (4) the contracting 
 
114 See also Directive 2014/24 /EU art. 67 (2) 
115 Ibid. art. 76 
116 Ibid. art. 76 
117 https://www.doffin.no/Notice/Details/2019-314737 
118 Ignacio Herrera Anchustegui, Division into Lots and Demand Aggregation – Extremes Looking for the Correct Balance? p. 
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authorities may, therefore, limit the number of lots that may be awarded one tenderer, even where 
tenders may be submitted for several or all lots.120  
Should the contracting authority decide to limit the number of lots that may be awarded one 
tenderer, this would not only enable SMEs to participate in the competition, but also ensure that the 
contracting authority awards a contract to more than one tenderer. In theory, then, such a limitation 
could allow the opportunity of more than one SME being awarded a public contract.  
A limiting of the number of lots that may be awarded one tenderer entails, however, an acceptation 
of the fact that contracts for some lots will not be awarded the tenderer with the most economically 
advantageous offer. As for labour market programmes, such a limitation may very likely result in a 
situation in which the users of the programmes in the lots that cannot be awarded the tender with 
the best price-quality ratio, will receive an offer of poorer quality than the users in the lots that are 
awarded the tenderer with the best price-quality ratio. This scenario will be a definite outcome 
where contracts are awarded based on fixed price or cost and a quality-only criterion.  
6. NAV case- study 
6.1 Background 
NAV is a pivotal public entity in the securing of the rights of the citizens to make a living through their 
work. As part of fulfilling the State’s constitutional obligations concerning employment, NAV 
administers welfare laws and regulations and is required by law to provide jobseekers with advice 
and help, in which labour market programmes are essential tools. NAV is also a contracting authority 
when procuring labour market programmes, subject to the public procurement regulations that aim 
to promote efficient use of society’s resources.  
Assessment and Follow-up are two nationally available labour market programmes.121 Pursuant to 
the Labour Market Regulation, Assessment and Follow-up are subject to the public procurement 
regulations.122 Following a change in the Labour Market Regulation from January 1, 2015, NAV in 
each county conducted a series of procurements of these programmes in 2015/2016. NAV has 
commenced new procurement processes of these programmes in 2019/2020.  
The change in the Labour Market Regulation was part of a government-initiated reform which aims 
were to simplify the regulations on labour market programmes, to increase the diversity of suppliers, 
and to increase the quality of the programmes through means of competition.123 The aim to increase 
the diversity of suppliers entailed an aim to facilitate the participation of SMEs.124  
The labour market programmes Assessment and Follow-up are described as follows on NAVs official 
homepage; “Assessment is available to both the employed and unemployed. The scheme is also an 
option for persons on long-term sick leave who wish to re-enter the labour market. Assessment 
entails extra assistance for to chart or test the participants work capabilities. It may chart or assess 
whether a person will be able to continue working at the same job if the working situation and/or 
work tasks need to be adapted to his or hers capabilities, what assistance or adaptations the 
participant needs to get a job, the participants skills, competences and opportunities”.125 
 
120 See also Directive 2014/24 /EU art. 46 (1) and (2) 
121 www.nav.no 
122 FOR 2015-12-11-1598 §§ 2-6 and 4-6 
123 Høringsnotat – et enklere tiltakssystem tilpasset brukernes behov, p. 1  




“Follow up is meant for those who are in need of personal assistance to gain or keep suitable 
employment, and need extensive placement and follow-up assistance. The measure is tailored to the 
participants individual needs based on his or her opportunities on the labour market. The participant 
can get practical assistance to find suitable tasks or employers beyond those he or she have already 
tried, adapt his or hers work or work situation and further guidance.”126 
6.2 The 2015/2016 procurement process 
NAV Rogaland published a contract notice for Follow-up on April 22, 2015 and for Assessment on 
May 20, 2015.128 An examination of the contract notices in Doffin shows that NAV Rogaland has 
chosen the procedure “negotiated procedure without pre-qualification.”131 As pointed out in chapter 
5 this choice of procedure, where any interested economic operator may submit a tender, promotes 
a high level of competition, thus more indirectly affecting the level of participation of SMEs. This 
procedure is also well suited to safeguard the interests of the users of the programmes, as it allows 
the contracting authorities to adjust the tenders through negotiations so that to best meet their 
expectations and the needs of the users.  
The selection criteria may, as also demonstrated in chapter 5, relate to suitability to pursue the 
professional activity, economic and financial standing and technical and professional ability. As for 
suitability to pursue the professional ability, NAV Rogaland has for both programmes required that 
the tenderer is a “legally established business.” The required means of proof is a certificate of 
registration from the Brønnøysund Register Centre.133 As for economic and financial standing, the 
criterion is that the tenderer has “sufficient financial capacity to perform the contract.” Means of 
proof is a credit evaluation and the company’s latest annual report, including an independent 
auditor’s report.  
When it comes to the selection criteria technical and professional ability, the criteria are “good 
performance capacity” and “methods for quality assurance.” Means of proof relating to performance 
is a description of the tenderer’s professional ability and a description of relevant units in the 
company. Means of proof relating to methods for quality assurance is a description of methods of 
quality assurance, and/or a certificate issued by an authorized company that proves compliance with 
a quality assurance standard.134  
What is particularly worth noticing with respect to the aim to facilitate the participations of SMEs, is 
that NAV Rogaland did not require for the economic operator to have experience from the 
performance of similar contracts, or for the economic operators to include the CV’s of staff assigned 
to perform the contracts. Such requirements would both have led to a de facto exclusion of newly 
established economic operators, or smaller operators that did not have the necessary staff in the 
pre-contractual phase.  
It is also worth noticing that the criterion related to economic and financial standing only requires 
“sufficient financial capacity to perform the contract”. The criterion is vague, but it is probably more 
lenient than a requirement made pursuant to the Public Procurement Regulation § 16-3 (1) a) that 
 
126 https://www.nav.no/en/home/benefits-and-services/relatert-informasjon/follow-up 
128 https://www.doffin.no/Notice/Details/2015-125758 and https://www.doffin.no/Notice/Details/2015-154747 
131 https://www.doffin.no/Notice/Details/2015-125758 and https://www.doffin.no/Notice/Details/2015-154747 
133 Brønnøysund Register Centre is a Norwegian government agency that is responsible for the management of numerous 







tenderers are obliged to have a certain minimum yearly turnover, including a certain minimum 
turnover in the area covered by the contract, which could exclude SMEs with smaller economies.  
As for the protection of the right to work, the imposing of selection criteria in these procurements 
helps ensure quality and stability of performance so that the interests of the individual is also 
safeguarded.  
The procurement documents furthermore shows that the contracts for both Assessment and Follow-
up will be awarded the most economically advantageous offer on the basis of the best price-quality 
ratio, in which the relative weighting of the quality and price criterion is 60 % and 40 % respectively. 
This weighing of the award criteria signals that quality is more important than price in the 
procurement of these programmes. An emphasis on quality may also, as demonstrated in chapter 5, 
be conducive to the participation of SMEs that focus particularly on quality, for instance through 
innovative services.   
Regarding the division of the contract into lots, NAV Rogaland has divided the contracts for 
Assessment and Follow-up into five geographical lots, where tenders may be submitted for all lots. 
This is yet, then, another practical example of how the aim to facilitate the participation of SMEs is 
enforced in the procurement of labour market programmes.  
6.3 The 2019/2020 procurement process 
Examining the contract notices for Assessment of February 6, 2020 and Follow-Up of September 5, 
2019,135 one of the most significant changes from the 2015/2016 process is that NAV Rogaland has 
now limited the number of lots that may be awarded one tenderer to two out of five lots. Tenders 
may be offered for all lots. NAV Rogaland has also changed the award criteria; the contract notice 
now states that the contract will be awarded the most economically advantageous offer on the basis 
of the best price-quality ratio, in which the relative weighting is quality 70 % and price 30 %.136  
The possibility of limiting the number of lots that may be awarded one tenderer, which is now an 
available option pursuant to the Public Procurement Regulation § 19 (4), was not an explicitly stated 
option for the contracting authority in 2015, which was prior to the implementation of Directive 
2014/24 EU in Norwegian law.  
Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, I have asked NAV Rogaland for the procurement 
protocols, including information on the price and quality assessments for the procurements of 
Follow-up in the 2019/2020 process.137 The documentation shows that the consequence of having 
limited the number of lots that may be awarded one tenderer, is that two of the lots are not awarded 
the tender with the best quality-price ratio. In both of these lots, the tenders that are awarded a 
contract are assessed to be of lower quality than the tender that would have won, had there not 
been such a limitation.   
I have asked for the same documentation from NAV Trøndelag. This documentation shows, similarly, 
that the contract in one lot is awarded a tender that is assessed to have the third-best quality-price 
ratio, and where the quality of this tender is assessed to be of considerably lower quality than the 
tender that would have won, had there not been a limitation in the number of lots that may be 
awarded one tenderer.  
 
135 https://www.doffin.no/Notice/Details/2019-326274 and https://www.doffin.no/Notice/Details/2020-392600 
136 https://www.doffin.no/Notice/Details/2020-392600 and https://www.doffin.no/Notice/Details/2019-326274 
137 LOV-2006-05-19-16 § 23 (3) 
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7. A legal barrier?  
7.1 The most problematic measure in the facilitation of the participation of SMEs in 
the procurement of labour market programmes 
In light of my thesis’ research problem, I believe that the most problematic measure in the 
facilitation of the participations of SMEs in the procurement of labour market programmes, is a 
decision pursuant to the Public Procurement Regulation § 19 (4) to limit the numbers of lots that may 
be awarded one tenderer, as was a measure opted for in the 2019/2020 NAV Rogaland procurement 
process.   
The mere inclusion of a cost or price criteria in the procurement of labour market programmes 
entails, of course, an acceptation of a belief that the efficient use of society’s resources requires cost-
control. There is always a risk, then, that the quality of the tender may not be the decisive factor 
when awarding a public contract.  
Although a matter of continuous political debate, there is also no doubt that health- and social 
services are subject to political priorities and cost containment, without this being a violation of 
fundamental civil rights. Legal preparations leading up to an amendment of the Norwegian 
Constitution § 110 in 1954 thus explicitly states that the nature of the State obligations concerning 
the right to work is determined by the economic circumstances under which the State operates at 
any given time.138 
Accepting the second or even third-best offer for some lots as a result of having limited the number 
of lots that may be awarded one tenderer has, however, nothing to do with cost control, and this, I 
believe, makes such a measure unique in the context of welfare services provided by the State as 
part of a constitutional obligation. Although one cannot be sure of the outcome, there is a risk that 
the second or third-best offer may even be of both higher price and poorer quality, something which 
is not  ‘value for money.’ This measure may, then, ultimately undermine the aim of the Public 
Procurement Act of ensuring the efficient use of society’s resources.  
A study on the effect of labour market programmes commissioned by the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs concludes that the quality of a labour market programme may be a decisive factor as to 
whether the programme achieves its objective; which is to strengthen the participants’ possibility to 
find and sustain employment. 139 As for the right to work, then, there is a risk that a poorer quality 
labour market programme weakens the mechanism of protection that these programmes offer as 
part of the constitutional obligation pursuant to § 110.  
Because these labour market programmes are so essential in the fulfilling of the State’s 
constitutional obligations on the right to work it may be easily argued, I believe, that a decision to 
limit the number of lots that may be awarded one tenderer in the procurement labour market 
programmes is not a sound discretionary decision. My thesis’ outset, however, is that § 110 may 
even impose a legal barrier in this respect.  
 
 
138 Innst. S. nr. 220 (1954) s. 584 
139 Proba samfunnsanalyse; Virkning av arbeidsrettede tiltak for personer med nedsatt arbeidsevne, Rapport 2011-02, p. 3 
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7.2 The interests of the community and the protection of the individual’s fundamental 
rights 
Although the Norwegian Constitution § 110 does not give the individual an unconditional claim to 
employment, my discussion in chapter 4 on the strength of the constitutional protection of the right 
to work has, nevertheless, shown that this provision clearly imposes a duty on the State to take 
necessary steps, as soon as possible, to ensure that everyone is protected from unemployment. At 
the same time, the State has a margin of appreciation in deciding how to regulate the exercise of this 
right so that both the general interest of the community and the protection of the individual’s 
fundamental right may be safeguarded.  
There can be little doubt that the Norwegian State has implemented both legislative, administrative, 
budgetary and judicial measures to ensure the safeguarding of the right to work. As demonstrated in 
chapter 1, Norway is among the OECD-countries that spend the most public funding on various 
labour market programmes and benefits for unemployed people.140 Furthermore, NAV administers 
extensive welfare regulations that entitles any person that seeks or needs assistance from a NAV 
office to find employment the right to an assessment of his or hers need for support, an assessment 
which may result in the initiation of a labour market programme.  
As an outset, then, it seems fair to say that the human rights obligations concerning the right to work 
are, generally, taken well care of in Norway. Maybe because of this relatively extensive support for 
unemployed people provided by the Norwegian State it has become too easy, however, not to 
continually question whether new laws, regulations or administrative decisions are aligned with the 
constitutional and international human rights obligations concerning this right.  
That administrative decisions have to take into consideration the constitutional protection of the 
right to work is clearly demonstrated through a 2008 decision by the Sivilombudsmannen.141 The 
case in question concerned the administrative agency’s duty pursuant to the Public Administration 
Act § 17 to clarify the case before an administrative decision is made.142 The administrative agency 
had rejected an application from the complainant of the issuing of an ID-card, allowing access to a 
secure zone in the airport. If not granted the ID-card, the complainant would be forced to decline a 
job-offer at the airport. The Sivilombudsmannen concluded that the clarification of the case had 
been inadequate on the part of the public administration. 
In his decision, the Sivilombudsmannen emphasises that the possibility for the individual to make a 
living through his or hers work is considered a fundamental asset in Norwegian society, and that the 
State’s duty to facilitate this is grounded in the Norwegian Constitution § 110, as well as in the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights article 6. The extent of the duty to 
clarify a case before making a decision that is pivotal to an individual’s possibility to work, the 
Sivilombudsmannen states, will therefore have to be interpreted in light of the State’s constitutional 
obligations.  
 
140 NOU Arbeidsrettede tiltak 2012:6 
141 Somb-2007/1398. The Ombudsman investigates complaints from citizens who believe they have suffered an injustice or 




7.3 A fair balance? 
The assessment of whether a decision pursuant to § 19 (4) of the Public Procurement Regulation 
violates the individual’s protection of the right to work in the procurement of labour market 
programmes will, as accounted for in chapter 3 on legal sources and methodology, have to be 
determined by applying the fair balance principle.  
The assessment of the lawfulness of § 19 (4) implies verifying whether this provision affects the core 
content of the right to work pursuant to § 110 of the Norwegian Constitution, or if this freedom can 
still be exercised otherwise. As demonstrated in chapter 4, a core obligation pursuant to article 6 of 
the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is to pay special attention to “the inclusion in 
working life of disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups” and “to move as 
expeditiously and effectively as possible towards the full realization of article 6.”143  
As for the core obligation concerning disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups, the 
labour market programmes are often targeted at such individuals and groups. The labour market 
programmes Assessment and Follow-Up, which were procured by NAV Rogaland in the 2015/2016 
and 2019/2020 procurement processes, are two examples in this respect. Assessment is available for 
“persons on long-term sick leave who wish to re-enter the labour market” and who need “extra 
assistance for to chart or test the participants work capabilities,” whereas Follow-up is available for 
“those who are in need of personal assistance to gain or keep suitable employment, and need 
extensive placement and follow-up assistance.”144  
As for the core obligation of moving as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards the full 
realization of article 6, there is a risk that a poorer quality labour market programme is not as 
effective in strengthening the participant’s possibility to find and sustain employment. Worst case 
scenario is that a poorer quality programme program results in a lengthened unemployment period 
for the individual, with reduced possibility of entering or returning to working life.  
The Covenant does not, however, entitle the individual to an optimal quality in the steps taken to 
ensure the realization of the right to work; it requires the State to satisfy a “minimum essential levels 
of each of the rights covered by the Covenant.”146 As long as the individual in need of a labour market 
programme is offered such a programme, and the programme provides a sufficient level of quality, 
then the freedom can still be exercised otherwise. The act of offering users in some lots a poorer 
quality programme is, I believe, an interference with the protection of the right to work. The 
interference cannot, however, be deemed unlawful.  
When it comes to the assessment of the proportionality of the interference, more specifically the  
assessment of the legitimate aim of the measure, Directive 2014/24/EU contains an explicit aim to 
facilitate the participation of SMEs in public procurement, as the participation of SMEs is considered 
pivotal in securing the positive effect of higher competition for public contracts, leading to better 
 
143 E/C.12/GC/18, 6 February 2006, General comment No. 18 Article 6 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights para. 20 
144 https://www.nav.no/en/home/benefits-and-services/relatert-informasjon/assessment and 
https://www.nav.no/en/home/benefits-and-services/relatert-informasjon/follow-up 
146 E/C.12/GC/18, 6 February 2006, General comment No. 18 Article 6 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights para. 31 
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value for money. Facilitating the participation of SMEs by means of limiting the number of lots that 
may be awarded one tenderer is a measure adopted in the general interest, and therefore legitimate.  
As for the appropriateness of the measure, a decision to limit the number of lots that may be 
awarded one tenderer will not only enable SMEs to participate in the competition, but also ensure 
that the contracting authority awards a contract to more than one tenderer. In theory, then, more 
than one SME may be awarded a contract. The measure is also suited to ensure supplier reliability 
and future competition as there will, inevitably, be more than one supplier in the market. In this 
respect, the measure may be deemed both effective and adequate to achieve its purpose.  
I believe that the strength of this argument relies, however, on there being an actual risk that future 
competition and supplier reliability of labour market programmes will be negatively affected if this 
measure is not adopted. As for the procurements of Assessment and Follow-up, the procurement 
protocols received from NAV Rogaland and NAV Trøndelag for the 2019/2020 procurement 
processes of Follow-up shows that Rogaland had a total of 17 tenderers in the competitions, whereas 
Trøndelag had 24; this is in spite of this measure not being used in the 2015/2016 procurement 
processes. This is not sufficient data to conclude that this will always be the case for all labour market 
programmes. It can be argued, nevertheless, that the risk of not having a sufficient level of 
competition or being able to secure the supplier reliability of labour market programmes, is low.  
When it comes to the necessity of the measure, I believe I have shown through my discussion in 
chapter 5 that there are a number of measures available to the contracting authority that are suited 
to promote the participation of SMEs in the procurement of labour market programmes. The 
measure pursuant to § 19 (4) is, however, the measure that most efficiently secures that more than 
one tenderer is awarded a public contract. I believe, nevertheless, that the contracting authority may 
facilitate the awarding of a contract to more than one tenderer by changing the design of the 
competitions. Instead of only diving the contracts into lots based on geographical considerations, the 
contracting authority could also target some labour market programmes at employment seekers 
with specific needs, something which may increase the chance of there being more diversity in the 
tenderers. Furthermore, the SMEs may avail themselves of the possibility of joint tendering and 
subcontracting pursuant to § 16-11 (1) and 19-2 (2), measures that will also secure the presence of 
more than one supplier.  
The final assessment in the fair balance test, is the assessment of whether the contested measure 
has managed to strike a fair balance between the demands of the public or general interest, and the 
protection of the individuals fundamental rights. It seems to me that this final question is answered 
by asking if there is a reasonable proportionality between the advantages of limiting the number of 
lots that may be awarded one tenderer, and the disadvantages that this measure implies for the 
individual. Although this may be a bold statement, I believe that this question will have to be 
answered negatively.  
Given that the number of suppliers for labour market programmes is high enough to secure future 
competition and supplier reliability, as shown in my NAV case-study, I can see no advantages of 
limiting the number of lots that may be awarded one tenderer. The disadvantage for the individual of 
being offered a poorer quality labour market programme may, on the other side, be considerable. 
Worst case scenario is that a poorer quality programme is detrimental to the individual’s possibility 
of finding and sustaining employment.  
27 
 
The limiting of the number of lots that may be awarded one tenderer in the procurement of labour 
market programmes clearly demonstrates a tension between the demands of the general interest of 
society, and the requirement to protect the individual’s fundamental right to work. These are, of 
course, both legitimate concerns. When the advantage of applying this particular measure is even 
uncertain, as there is only a possibility that the abandoning of this measure will affect future 
competition and supplier reliability, then the fundamental right of the individual must weigh more 
heavily. The general principle of equality laid down in the Norwegian Constitution § 98, which states 
that all people are equal under the law and that no human must be subject to unfair or 
disproportionate differential treatment, strengthens this argument, as the applying of this measure 
weakens the constitutional protection of ensuring that all individuals and groups of people are 
allowed to participate in working life.  
7.4 The consequence of a violation of § 110 
The constitutional provisions serve as legal barriers. New legislation must, therefore, stay within the 
limits of the Norwegian Constitution.149 The constitutional provisions are also relevant in the 
interpretation of laws and regulations,150 something which was illustrated through the case from the 
Sivilombudsmannen, to which I referred to earlier in this chapter.  
Regardless of whether a constitutional provision acts a legal barrier there is, when interpreting laws 
and regulations, an obligation to seek to find a solution that is aligned with the principles of the 
Constitution. In cases where the contested provision leaves room for more than one possible 
interpretation there is an obligation, then, to interpret the provisions so that it is in harmony with the 
constitutional right or obligation. The challenge with § 19 (4) of the Public Procurement Regulation is 
not, however, that this provision is unclear. It is rather a question of this provision, when being 
applied in the procurement of labour market programmes, not being aligned with the constitutional 
protection of the right to work.  
One particular feature of the obligation pursuant to § 92 of the Constitution to respect and ensure 
human rights, is the Norwegian Supreme Court’s right and duty to set aside or interpret narrowly any 
legal provision that proves to be contrary to the Norwegian Constitution, in particular as to 
constitutional rights and freedoms of individuals. In setting a provision aside, the Supreme Court 
“limits itself to cutting the provision’s normative power in the particular case.”151 The ground-
breaking judgment in this respect is Grev Wedel Jarlsberg v. Marinedepartementet from 1866. In this 
judgment the Norwegian Supreme Court for the first time publicly declared that the Court would not 
apply any law as far as the law was found to be in conflict with the Norwegian Constitution.152  
If an individual, in a case of being offered a labour market programme of poorer quality as a result of 
an effort to facilitate the participation of SMEs, did instigate legal proceedings with a claim that State 
legislation or practice is in breach with § 110, and the Court found that § 19 (4) is in violation of the 
constitutional protection of the right to work, this would imply that § 19 (4) would have to be set 
aside as for the procurement of the specific labour market programme. Moreover, such a ruling 
 
149 NOU: 2009: 14, para 25.5.1 
150 Ibid. para. 25.5.3 
151 Supreme Court Justice dr. Arnfinn Bårdsen, Norwegian Supreme Court: The Norwegian Supreme Court as the Guardian 
of Constitutional Rights and Freedoms (“Norway in Europe, Centre for European Law, Oslo 18th September 2017), p. 3 
152 Ibid. p. 4 
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would inevitably propel a change in the Public Procurement Regulation, as § 110 may then serve as a 
basis for legal proceedings in similar cases.  
8. Conclusion  
8.1 Introduction 
The purpose of my thesis has been to discuss what legal dilemmas may arise when facilitating the 
participation of SMEs in the procurement of labour market programmes; programmes that are 
essential tools in fulfilling of the State’s constitutional obligation to protect the individual’s right to 
work. Moreover, I have aimed to clarify whether § 110 of the Norwegian Constitution imposes a legal 
barrier as to what measures the contracting authority may make us of in the effort to facilitate the 
participation of SMEs in the procurement of such programmes, and to determine what will be the 
consequences of such a limitation. I have also asked the question of whether the aim in Directive 
2014/24/EU to facilitate the participation of SMEs has sparked a change in NAVs procurement 
practice regarding the procurements of labour market programmes.  
8.2 Findings 
Although § 110 does not give the individual an unconditional claim to employment, my discussion 
has shown that the provision clearly imposes a duty on the State to take necessary steps, as soon as 
possible, to ensure that everyone is protected from unemployment.  
Being subject to the public procurement regulations, the procurement of labour market programmes 
is not exempt from the aim of Directive 2014/24/EU to facilitate the participation of SMEs in public 
procurement. The reality of this has been demonstrated through my NAV case-study.  
As my discussion has shown, the procurement regulations allow for several options that may 
facilitate the participation of SMEs in the procurement of labour market programmes. The 
application of these measures in the procurement of labour market programmes demonstrate, 
however, a tension between the demands to increase competition by means of facilitating the 
participation of SMEs, and a requirement to protect of the individual’s right to work by ensuring the 
necessary stability, continuity and quality of performance in the delivery of these programmes.  
My discussion has furthermore shown that the procurement of health- and social services, to which 
classification the procurement of labour market programmes belongs, is subject to both a higher EU-
threshold and a more lenient set of rules within the public procurement regime. This strongly 
indicates that the need to ensure quality and continuity for the individual user of a labour market 
programmes is pivotal, and therefore weighs more heavily than other considerations, such as the 
inclusion of SMEs.  
Applying the fair balance test developed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), I have 
looked at one particular measure available to the contracting authorities that may increase 
competition and facilitate the participation of SMEs; the measure pursuant to § 19 (4) of the Public 
Procurement Regulation of limiting the number of lots that may be awarded one tenderer. I have 
argued that the constitutional duty on the State pursuant to § 110 imposes a legal barrier that 
prevents the use of this measure in the procurement of labour market programmes. My analysis 
rests, finally, on the argument that there is not reasonable proportionality between the advantages 
of limiting the number of lots that may be awarded one tenderer, and the disadvantages that this 
measure implies for the individual. The consequence of such a conclusion is that § 19 (4) has no be 
set aside in the procurement of labour market programmes, thus no longer being an available option 
for the contracting authorities.  
29 
 
The topic and research question of this thesis remains under researched and discussed in Norwegian 
labour and procurement law. My findings suggests setting aside a provision in cases where the policy 
objective of allowing for SME participation in procurement processes clashes with the constitutional 
protection of the individual’s right to work. Such a claim may not yet find basis in case law because of 
the scarcity of rulings concerning the strength of the constitutional protection pursuant to § 110.  
Furthermore, the constitutional protection of § 110 has not been prevalent in the political discourse 
on unemployment. This does not, however, render my argument less valid. Such lack of discussion 
probably rests on the fact that there is broad political consensus in Parliament that full employment 
is an overall objective, and that the State shall use both financial and political means to achieve this 
objective. I believe there is still, therefore, considerable uncertainty as to the legal effect of § 110. 
This is also why I have chosen to end my thesis with a de lega lata consideration, which I will present 
in the following. 
8.3 A duty to work? 
The Norwegian Constitution § 110, first paragraph, second sentence states that those who cannot 
themselves provide for their own subsistence have the right to support from the state.155 This 
provision in the Constitution entails an obligation on the State to provide a social security system. 
The Norwegian welfare state rests, however, on the condition that adult people capable of work 
provide for themselves and their families. The social security system is, therefore, subsidiary to self-
support.156  
The 1948-proposal for the amendment of the Norwegian Constitution § 110, as discussed in chapter 
3 of my thesis, spoke of both a duty and a right to work. What was primarily discussed during the 
debate following the proposal was the right to work. The argument put forward concerning the duty 
to work was that the State already had the necessary legal regulations to instigate a duty to work if 
the nation was faced with a serious crisis. As for people who in regular times simply did not want to 
work, the Vagrant Act was designed to meet this challenge, it was argued.159 Moreover, the duty to 
work was considered to be strong both morally and legally.160 
The reality today is that the majority of the State welfare-benefits are compensations for lost 
income, and entails a condition that the applicant has had an income that exceeds a certain yearly 
minimum. In the case of people being unemployed there is, furthermore, a condition that the 
receiver of the benefit contribute actively in the process of finding or returning to work.162 This 
includes having to accept appropriate labour market programmes initiated by NAV.163  
It may be bold to argue that § 110 first paragraph, first sentence imposes a legal barrier as to what 
measures the contracting authority may make use of in the effort to facilitate the participation of 
SMEs in the procurement of labour market programmes. Full employment is, however, an 
overarching political objective, and the labour market programmes are essential tools in the labour 
market policy to meet the strong social expectation that people provide for themselves, and to 
prevent the social and financial consequences for both society and the individual should he or she fail 
to do so. If unemployed people in some lots are de facto discriminated by means of not receiving the 
 
155 LOV-1814-05-17; “Den som ikke selv kan sørge for sitt livsopphold, har rett til støtte fra det offentlige”. 
156 Asbjørn Kjønstad, Aslak Syse og Morten Kjelland, Velferdsrett I: Grunnleggende rettigheter, rettssikkerhet og tvang, 
Gyldendal Juridisk, 6th ed. 2017, p. 405 
159 Løsgjengerloven, Lov 31. mai 1900 nr. 5 om Løsgjængeri, Betleri og Drukkenskab 
160 Innst. S. nr. 220 (1954) s. 584 
162 LOV-1997-02-28-19 
163 LOV-2004-12-10-76 §§ 16 and 17 
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best labour market programme available, thus having their possibility of finding and sustaining 
employment reduced in order to advance other political goals, this would, I believe, be difficult to 
sustain publicly.  
A change in the Public Procurement Regulation that disallows the use of § 19 (4) in the procurement 
of labour market programmes will secure that the individual user of a programme gets the best offer 
available. This would create better harmony between the political aim to achieve full employment, 
and the duty to provide a social security system for those who are unemployed. The aim to facilitate 
the participation of SMEs and to secure supplier reliability of labour market programmes, can be 
supported by an alternative design of the procurement, in which a better balance is found between 
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